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Institutional and theoretical background
There is nowadays much interest in worker participation on efficiency grounds, and the German works council has emerged as an interesting exemplar whose effects on firm performance are not yet well understood. According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils may be elected by the workers in all establishments exceeding a size threshold of five permanent employees, and the employer has to bear the entire cost of the apparatus. Works councils are give n extensive rights of information (e.g. on the introduction of new working methods), consultation (e.g. on manpower planning) and even codetermination (on the regulation of working hours and overtime, health and safety measures etc.). In contrast to unions, however, they may not call a strike, and the law enjoins the employer and the works council to "work together in a spirit of mutual trust" (for details, see Addison et al., 2001) .
From an economic perspective, works councils can be interpreted as having two faces: On the one hand, works councils can use their extensive rights to delay or modify management decisions and to redistribute rents to the employees. On the other hand, the machinery of a works council holds out the prospect of an improvement in the efficiency (and thus in the joint surplus) of the enterprise stemming from information exchange, consultation and codetermination. These issues are addressed by Freeman and Lazear (1995) in a works council-specific model that extends the well-known rent-seeking and collective voice arguments discussed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) for the case of company unions.
Due to these two faces, theory provides meager guidance as to the likely effects of a works council on firm performance. The few empirical studies for Germany suggest that both faces seem to play a role, with works councils being associated with lower profitability, higher wages, reduced labour fluctuation, unclear productivity effects and insignificant effects on innovation (see, e.g., FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987 , Frick, 1996 , Addison et al., 2001 , and Dilger, 2002 . In order to examine whether works councils act as sand or grease in the operation of a firm, we make use of a large-scale panel data set and of stochastic production frontier analysis, an econometric technique that has not been applied yet to study the efficiency effects of works councils.
Empirical estimates
For our empirical analysis we use the representative IAB Establishment Panel (see Kölling 2000 for a detailed description of this dataset). Each year since 1993 (1996) , this panel has surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors in western (eastern) Germany.
We consider a stochastic production frontier function of the following form:
where it y denotes the logarithm of total sales of plant i at time t; it X is the vector of inputs of plant i at time t which includes the logarithm of employment and the logarithm of (plant-)mean investment over the sample period 1 and as further covariates the percentages of part-time employees, of apprentices, of skilled employees and of female employees, 41 sector dummies and 7 year dummies;
α is an intercept term; β is a vector of technology parameters; it v captures statistical white noise and i u depicts technical inefficiency, which is assumed to be nonnegative and time-invariant. Defining
which can be estimated by a fixed-effects regression. Following Schmidt and Sickles (1984) , we normalise the efficiency of the most efficient plant as 100%. Hence, estimates of the technical efficiencies for the other plants are obtained as intercept shifts to the most efficient plant:
Since Equation (1) is specified in logarithms, producer-specific estimates of technical efficiencies, which are defined by the ratio of a plant's actual output to its maximal attainable output, are then given by effects estimation can control for unobservables which are time-invariant, the impact of a works council cannot be identified directly since very few establishments installed (or deinstalled) a works council during the sample period.
Technical efficiency estimates obtained according to Equations (2)- (4) are reported in the first two rows. As the standard errors of the estimated fixed-effects are inversely related to the number of times a plant is observed, the standard error of the median technical efficiency may be relatively large (respectively small), depending on whether the median contains a plant which is observed only once (respectively eight times). Since it would not make much sense to draw conclusions from technical efficiencies of plants which occur only once in the regression sample of the unbalanced dataset, we report the technical efficiency and its confidence interval from the plant which is observed eight times and which is closest to the median. This had almost no effect on the reported efficiency, but affected the reported confidence intervals.
As can be seen, in all four cases do the confidence intervals of the median plant with a works council and the median plant without a works council overlap. We have also stratified the two samples into production and services to check for the robustness of the results, and, in addition, we have used two different 5 -year balanced datasets, 1996-2000 and 1993-1997 (results are reported in the appendix). However, our main finding remains unaffected. We do not find clear-cut evidence that the production process is significantly more efficient in plants with a works council.
Conclusion
Stochastic production frontier analysis with a large-scale panel dataset indicates that establishments with and without a works council do not exhibit significant differences in efficiency. Most likely, negative rent-seeking effects and positive voice effects balance each other with respect to efficiency, implying that worker participation is not simply the sand or the grease as which it is interpreted by its opponents and supporters, respectively. (2)- (4). One fixed-effects regression for each of the four columns with (log) total sales as the dependent variable and as independent variables: (log) employment, the percentages of part-time employees, of apprentices, of skilled employees and of female employees and year dummies.
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